Farida Kurbangaleeva: Welcome to everyone watching this stream. This is a live broadcast. My name is Farida Kurbangaleeva. My guest today is public figure, political strategist, and gallerist Marat Guelman. Marat, good evening. Thank you very much for joining us.
Marat Guelman: Good evening.
Kurbangaleeva: We will, of course, be talking about Moldova. You were born in this country, you are a citizen of Moldova, and furthermore, you are in Moldova right now. I hope I’m not revealing any military secret. You came here, it seems, to engage in political technology—returning to your old profession. Could you please tell us why this is so important to you right now?
Guelman: That's not entirely accurate. If you'll allow me, I’d like to clarify.
I have a very significant milestone in my life happening this Tuesday, the 16th: I am donating my collection of Moldovan artists to the national museum. This serves as a symbolic return. My first step was organizing a Vladimir Sorokin exhibition here; this is the second. Naturally, given my trajectory, simply acquiring a passport doesn't instantly make you a Moldovan again—it requires active work, a tangible narrative. That is the core driver for me.
Secondly, you are correct that as a member of the Moldovan diaspora, I have involved myself quite actively in these upcoming parliamentary elections.
Kurbangaleeva: I see.
Guelman: At least a quarter of all Moldovans currently earn their living abroad. The diaspora is not a fringe minority or a few isolated public figures; it constitutes a massive segment of the population that plays an active role in the country's development.
My donation mirrors this pattern: Moldovans work in Germany or Italy and send money home to build houses in their native villages. The primary stream of investment into the country flows directly from the diaspora.
Furthermore, these elections represent more than a domestic parliamentary vote—they serve as an active battlefield against Putin. Crucially, it's a battleground where our chances of victory are realistic. That is why I am dedicating my time and expertise to this effort right now.
Kurbangaleeva: When you say "our chances," you are likely referring to the party of current President Maia Sandu, the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), which is competing in these elections. Is it fair to say that this political force is confronting a powerful landing force of pro-Russian proxies? If so, could you tell us more about them?
Guelman: The reality is somewhat more complex. Without the Kremlin’s aggressive intervention, the domestic political landscape would be far more varied. You have PAS, several smaller pro-European parties, an array of legacy political parties funded by the Kremlin, and middle-ground groups like the "Alternative" bloc, which claims it can maintain friendly ties with both Europe and Russia.
However, because the Kremlin is intervening so brazenly, the dynamic has been simplified. It has simplified because what we are witnessing is an attempted non-military invasion. In this context, there is little room for nuance.
Many of my colleagues and I have valid criticisms of PAS. They were the ruling party and formed a single-party government, so all governance shortcomings fall on their shoulders. Additionally, they faced external shocks like the war in Ukraine and the pandemic—factors beyond their control that nonetheless depressed living standards. Because they governed alone rather than in a coalition, they absorbed all the public frustration.
Yet, they are the only political force standing directly and unequivocally against Putin’s aggression. So the race broadly boils down to PAS versus the pro-Kremlin bloc. The intermediary groups either play no constructive role or inadvertently assist the Kremlin.
For instance, my acquaintances in the "Alternative" bloc claim they can negotiate cheap gas with the Kremlin. In doing so, they mislead the public into believing that reasonable compromises with the Kremlin are still possible.
Kurbangaleeva: I understand.
Guelman: That's why we support PAS right now—because our fundamental goal is preserving Moldova’s sovereignty from the Kremlin.
The Kremlin is staging a massive effort, pouring in huge sums of money—huge by Moldovan standards. While a drop in the ocean compared to the billion dollars Putin spends daily on the war in Ukraine, these funds represent a massive sum inside Moldova aimed at capturing the state.
We have information indicating that they are attempting to recruit specific Moldovan citizens as agents. A Moldovan passport grants visa-free travel across the European Union. We already have evidence of attempts to recruit Moldovans for subversive operations inside Europe.
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Kurbangaleeva: Indeed.
Guelman: Furthermore, their strategic ambition is to seize political control in Moldova to establish a staging ground bypassing Mykolaiv toward Odesa via Transnistria. Their operational plans for Moldova are serious, making this an active assault.
The presidential election took place less than a year ago, which means the electorate is already politically engaged. It is well established that the majority of Moldovan citizens favor European integration.
Kurbangaleeva: Right.
Guelman: Faced with that reality, the Kremlin is attempting to straight-up buy votes. I have never witnessed vote-buying executed on this financial scale anywhere else.
Kurbangaleeva: How is this vote-buying executed technically?
Guelman: There are several channels. First, using banks in break-away Transnistria that maintain correspondent accounts with Russian financial institutions, allowing direct wire transfers into individual accounts.
Second, cryptocurrency networks are heavily utilized.
Third, during last year's presidential election, they utilized charter flights where each of the two hundred passengers carried $10,000 in cash—the maximum legal threshold for undeclared cash entry.
Kurbangaleeva: I see.
Guelman: They consolidate these funds and deploy them brazenly. It is an industrial-scale operation.
Kurbangaleeva: To clarify, are we talking about directly bribing average voters?
Guelman: Yes, and in massive numbers. In a country the size of Moldova, they are targeting roughly 150,000 individual voters.
To break down the arithmetic: baseline voters receive around €300 simply for casting a designated vote. The regional coordinators organizing these groups receive significantly more. They are paying people up to €3,000 to participate in anti-government rallies.
This is the first time I have seen a scheme where cash distribution isn't concealed, but actively advertised with slogans like: "Yes, we are paying you, we are rich, and we will solve your problems."
Ilan Shor, who currently operates out of Skolkovo in Moscow managing these capital flows, has surpassed even Putin in sheer cynicism. While Putin attempts to maintain a veneer of democratic procedure, Shor openly boasts that Russia is wealthy and handing out cash for votes.
Kurbangaleeva: How do they target the citizens they intend to bribe?
Guelman: They exploit vulnerable demographics—those facing economic hardship. They capitalize on the fact that utility bills surged following the onset of the war in Ukraine.
It is hard to harshly judge impoverished citizens: on one hand, they are compromising their country's long-term future; on the other hand, they face immediate financial distress.
Consequently, the primary mechanism to halt this is law enforcement intervention. We were fortunate that a similar scheme was deployed during the presidential election, allowing law enforcement to document specific cases and apprehend cash distributors red-handed.
Investigations into electoral corruption have been opened, and fines have been levied against individuals proven to have sold their votes. These fines significantly exceed the bribe amounts received, serving as an effective deterrent.
Concurrently, the political goal is ensuring that PAS secures a sufficient margin of victory to overcome the impact of these bought votes.
Kurbangaleeva: How would the political landscape in Moldova shift if a pro-Russian coalition were to secure a majority in parliament?
Guelman: First and foremost, Moldova would be detached from the pro-Ukrainian international coalition. Currently, Moldova operates as an active ally of Ukraine.
Kurbangaleeva: Right.
Guelman: Millions of Ukrainian refugees passed through Moldova and received assistance. Crucially, Moldova shares a long, secure border with Ukraine's Odesa region.
If a pro-Russian coalition took power, Ukraine would be forced to divert military resources to secure that southwestern border, building defensive positions similar to those in Donetsk or Kharkiv. Russian forces could attempt airlifts or troop deployments into Transnistria.
With the war in Ukraine largely stalled along the main front line, gaining a friendly, Kremlin-aligned proxy state along Ukraine's vulnerable southern flank would represent a major strategic asset for Moscow. That scenario must be prevented.
Secondly, although Moldova is not an EU member state, its citizens enjoy visa-free travel throughout Europe. A Kremlin-aligned government in Chisinau could allow Moscow's hybrid warfare operations to spread across Western Europe using Moldovan documentation.
This isn't merely a repetition of the situation in Georgia, where the ruling party maintains commercial ties with Moscow while playing both sides. This is an explicit effort to capture the Moldovan state apparatus and repurpose it as a strategic instrument.
Groups like the "Alternative" bloc claim they can maintain neutrality and negotiate cheap gas with Moscow, but they ignore recent history. In Ukraine, the Yanukovych administration attempted a similar dual-track policy—balancing relations with Moscow while negotiating an Association Agreement with the EU. When the EU agreement was finalized for signature, the Kremlin issued hard ultimatums: pay back all state debts immediately, face gas price spikes, and endure trade blockades, or abandon the European agreement.
Politicians promising cheap gas via Kremlin negotiations ignore the fact that this exact dynamic triggered the Euromaidan revolution in Kyiv. Citizens who valued European integration took to the streets to oppose their government's capitulation. You cannot maintain a middle-ground position with the Kremlin while it is actively engaged in a conflict with Europe.
Kurbangaleeva: How can a society counter tactics like vote-buying?
Guelman: The first step, as I mentioned, is directly disrupting the financial conduits used to distribute illicit funds.
The second step is voter mobilization. A clear majority of Moldovans favor European integration and recognize the threat posed by the Kremlin, but pro-European demographics tend to demonstrate lower voter turnout.
Kurbangaleeva: I see.
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Guelman: Voter mobilization is essential right now. A misconception has taken hold: because President Maia Sandu enjoys high international standing and meets regularly with European leaders, many voters assume victory is already assured.
The diaspora has mobilized significantly this year, which will play a decisive role. Moldovans living and working in Europe overwhelmingly back European integration.
Our main vulnerability is voter complacency among pro-European citizens.
Concurrently, we are working to expose how Shor and his political proxies act explicitly in foreign interests. To support this, figures from the Russian anti-war opposition—Garry Kasparov, Dmitry Gudkov, Anastasia Shevchenko, and myself—produced videos explaining to Moldovan voters the realities of the current regime in Moscow. Undecided Moldovan voters often lack a clear understanding of daily life under Putin's government, making direct testimony from Russian dissidents particularly effective.
It creates a unique dynamic: inside Moldova, we are continuing our broader anti-Putin advocacy. For me, this work represents my duty as part of the Moldovan diaspora, while for my colleagues, it serves as a continuation of democratic Russian resistance to the Kremlin. Achieving a decisive outcome here would mark a major victory against Putin's regional influence.
Kurbangaleeva: Marat, why has Moldova historically remained so vulnerable to Russian influence compared to other former territories of the Russian Empire, such as the Baltic states, Poland, or Finland?
Guelman: Moldova retains a sizable Russian-speaking population, largely due to historical language dynamics. For a long period, many citizens consumed Russian state television, as local Moldovan programming was more limited.
Moldova’s language policies have historically been accommodating: Russian-language schools continue to operate, and students can complete their first two years of university coursework in Russian. The system was considerably more flexible than Ukraine's. However, this open media space allowed Russian state broadcasts to shape public perception unchallenged for years.
Additionally, Russian-speaking demographics are geographically concentrated in regions like Gagauzia and Transnistria, intensifying regional political divisions.
While Moldova benefits from lacking a direct land border with Russia—a major strategic advantage—Russian state television continued to project significant influence across the country.
Furthermore, when the war broke out and Moldova adopted a pro-Ukrainian position, energy prices rose sharply as a result of regional disruptions. Pro-Russian opposition figures capitalized on economic anxiety, publicly arguing that President Sandu should travel to Moscow to negotiate discounted gas rates. Economic hardship remains a potent political lever.
Leaders of pro-Kremlin factions speak openly about these visits. Igor Dodon, the former socialist president, routinely travels to Moscow and returns claiming that a government led by his faction would secure reduced energy prices.
Kurbangaleeva: Igor Dodon is the former president of Moldova, correct?
Guelman: Yes, a former president and leader of the Socialist Party.
This overt cynicism represents a distinct shift in regional politics that emerged after the war began. We saw a similar dynamic in Georgia, where campaign billboards displayed images of destroyed Ukrainian cities alongside slogans asking voters: "Do you want Georgia to end up like Ukraine?"
This dynamic is unprecedented in modern campaign messaging. Traditionally, political actors attempted to frame their objectives in terms of public good. Today, pro-Kremlin proxies openly leverage fear and transactional offers, stating: "We will provide €300 for your vote or lower your utility bills."
This approach reflects a broader rise in transactional, cynical political rhetoric globally. You see echoes of this style in Donald Trump's public statements—such as framing security assistance to Ukraine purely as a commercial transaction funded by European nations.
For European democratic forces, this dynamic offers a clear lesson: assuming that historical progress inevitably moves toward democratic norms has allowed reactionary political forces to gain ground. Re-evaluating these assumptions is essential.
In Moldova, despite public debate surrounding the government's economic performance, PAS remains the primary political vehicle capable of countering this strategic threat.
(Technical disruption—connection temporarily drops)
Kurbangaleeva: We have a minor technical glitch. Marat Guelman has disconnected, and I am waiting to see if he will rejoin. We are discussing the upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova scheduled for September 28th...
Guelman: I am back. My apologies, an incoming phone call interrupted the connection.
Kurbangaleeva: Welcome back. Marat, you mentioned the southern regions of Ukraine through which Russian forces could theoretically reach Moldova. You have likely seen the photograph of Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, sitting beneath an operational map where Ukraine's Odesa and Mykolaiv regions were shaded to match occupied territory. How dangerous is this situation for Moldova? Do you think Putin will attempt to reach Moldova through military force?
Guelman: No, I believe their immediate strategy centers on securing political control of Moldova through these elections, and subsequently using a controlled Moldova to threaten southern Ukraine.
Kurbangaleeva: How would capturing Moldova politically be achieved in practice?
Guelman: Consider a scenario where a pro-Kremlin bloc forms a parliamentary majority, forms the government, signs bilateral agreements, and permits the expansion of Russian military presence in Transnistria from its current small garrison to tens of thousands of troops. Transnistria would then function similarly to Belarus—as a staging territory for potential military aggression.
That represents their primary operational plan. Attempting a direct overland military push through Odesa to reach Moldova is far less feasible strategically.
This explains why Moscow is directing substantial financial resources toward influencing Moldovan politics. The objective isn't merely political control over Moldova itself, but acquiring a strategic leverage point in its broader war against Ukraine.
By defending Moldova's democratic institutions, we are safeguarding national sovereignty, preventing the establishment of a hostile military foothold on Europe's border, and denying Moscow a strategic advantage.
Assuming pro-democracy voters turn out reliably, the pro-Kremlin strategy faces clear structural limits. Public opinion polling consistently indicates that pro-European sentiment holds a solid majority. While polling struggle to capture the impact of illicit vote-buying schemes, the high turnout expected among the Moldovan diaspora provides a strong counterweight.
However, as the election date approaches, the risk of high-profile political provocations increases significantly given what is at stake.
Kurbangaleeva: Would you characterize Moscow's strategy in Moldova as hybrid warfare?
Guelman: It is political aggression rather than conventional warfare. Maintaining a clear distinction between military force and non-military state subversion is important.
It is an aggressive campaign that systematically violates Moldovan electoral laws. The operation is managed directly by Sergey Kiriyenko’s Directorate for Domestic Policy inside the Kremlin, following the dissolution of the Kozak commission that previously handled relations with Ukraine and Moldova. Managing Moldovan affairs through a domestic policy office reflects Moscow's underlying imperial framing.
While this represents political subversion today, a success would pave the way for broader hybrid operations tomorrow—including utilizing Moldovan documentation to deploy intelligence operatives across Western Europe visa-free.
This conflict goes beyond a small nation protecting its independence; it is a critical front in resisting broader regional aggression. Because Moscow lacks the military resources to open an active second conventional front, it relies heavily on financial subversion, disinformation, and lawbreaking to achieve its objectives.
Kurbangaleeva: How significant is the fact that Moldova is not a member of NATO?
Guelman: Following recent geopolitical developments surrounding Ukraine—including international security guarantees and bilateral defense agreements—NATO membership is viewed somewhat more pragmatically.
Formal NATO membership is no longer the sole prerequisite for receiving substantial international defense support. For example, Moldova receives direct military assistance and equipment from France and other partner nations.
Historically, Moldova preserved its national identity not through large-scale military engagements, but through diplomatic maneuvering and adaptability while navigating regional conflicts.
The primary challenge facing Moldova today is internal: countering economic hardship and preventing political cynicism from undermining democratic participation.
I believe the most acute phase of this political crisis is being successfully navigated. Maia Sandu’s party is positioned to secure the largest share of votes in the election, granting it the constitutional mandate to form the next government.
Following September 28th, Moscow's political options will narrow, forcing any further interventions out into the open where their intent becomes obvious to the Moldovan public.
Kurbangaleeva: Vladimir Putin famously remarked that "Russia's borders do not end anywhere." Paraphrasing his quote, where do you see the limits of his geopolitical ambitions? Do they end in the Donbas, Kyiv, Transnistria, Moldova, or elsewhere?
Guelman: Boris Nemtsov accurately observed years ago that Putin will only stop where he is actively stopped. He will not halt voluntarily.
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The Ukrainian military resistance represents a historic event that fundamentally disrupted Moscow's initial strategic objectives during the first month of the invasion. While the Kremlin subsequently adjusted its operational goals and prolonged the war, its original objectives were permanently derailed.
Moving forward, internal domestic developments inside the Russian Federation will play a decisive role. The regime destroyed the remaining elements of press freedom and democratic process domestically to sustain the war effort.
If active hostilities conclude, the regime will face severe domestic challenges, including the reintegration of hundreds of thousands of combat veterans into society. State actions will increasingly be driven by the imperative of domestic regime survival rather than external expansion.
While some Western analysts suggest isolating Russia entirely, I believe the current regime model remains economically unsustainable over the long term.
Whether the system eventually collapses under its own weight or tilts into deep economic dependency on China, the outcome will fundamentally alter the regional balance. A dominant Chinese influence, while presenting distinct challenges, operates within a framework focused primarily on economic competition rather than direct military confrontation.
While current conditions remain difficult for creative and independent thinkers inside Russia, Russian language and culture will continue to evolve dynamically abroad within diaspora communities.
The writer Mikhail Shishkin once suggested that operating beyond state control might ultimately enable a new cultural renaissance for Russian-language literature and art outside the Russian Federation.
Kurbangaleeva: Marat, thank you very much for this comprehensive conversation. A reminder to our viewers that my guest today was public figure, political strategist, and gallerist Marat Guelman.
Guelman: And recently, an artist as well.
Kurbangaleeva: And an artist. Thank you, Marat. Goodbye.
Guelman: Goodbye.
