Gallerist and political strategist Marat Guelman is opening a new gallery in the center of Berlin. In an interview with Konstantin Eggert on DW’s show #inTRENDde, he shared his predictions for Russia’s future, discussed what he believes will happen to Putin’s grip on power, outlined how the war against Ukraine might end, detailed the shifting moods among Russian officials, and reflected on the concepts of guilt and responsibility among Russians.
Konstantin Eggert: We spoke almost two years ago. Back then, you said that Putin might resort to war as a tool to sustain his political power. That is exactly what happened. What comes next?
Marat Guelman: The war has turned into a permanent state of existence. Regardless of what happens on the front line, both Ukraine and Russia will remain in a state of war. Putin thought he was much stronger and attacked what he perceived as a weak opponent. It turned out that at least two equivalent social states clashed, and there won't be a simple solution—like a Ukrainian flag over the Kremlin or Kadyrovites parading into Kyiv. To me, it is obvious that Ukraine is winning. Over the past year, it has turned the most powerful half of the world not just into its allies, but into its closest comrades-in-arms.
Everyone will be waiting for the finale, which will play out not on the front line, but in Moscow. The speed with which Vladimir Putin has begun restructuring Russian life is unbelievable. This pace implies two things. First, Putin’s loyalists will begin devouring the regime from within. They will start looking for enemies. In fact, they are already looking for them among their own military bloggers; they have already raided the police forces to find whoever was leaking the personal data of Russian servicemen. Alternatively, if they slow these processes down, then a certain part of society will finally snap out of it.
Eggert: A significant portion of Russian society lives as if nothing is happening. People say, "We will just try to live a normal life"—almost like during the late Brezhnev era. Why would this continue?
Guelman: Real changes happen only when the old way of living becomes absolutely impossible. The repressive machinery will become more important than everything else. For instance, imagine a loyal theater director. He staged the "right" plays, fired dissenting actors, but eventually, some writer from the radical-nationalist newspaper Zavtra will return from the front lines in Donbas and say: "Listen, this guy is just an opportunist, he is actually a European at heart." These people will arrive and demand further purges, demanding that the entire country be turned into Donbas. On the other hand, figures like Kadyrov, Zolotov, and the army will demand that the whole country transform into a military camp: "There is a war going on, we are all at the front. What are you doing here in Moscow, continuing your peaceful life while people are dying out there?" These processes will force a certain number of people to make a choice.
Eggert: And who will these people be? You used to interact extensively with representatives of the Russian bureaucracy—the governors for whom cultural projects were created, the officials upon whom the Putin regime rests. What do they think about what is happening right now?
Guelman: They are waiting for the moment when the Kremlin weakens and some semblance of power returns to them. Ninety-five percent of governors, officials, and ministers think: "There is the West, which hits us with sanctions, supplies weapons to Ukraine, and has Russian frontmen like Khodorkovsky and Kasparov. We definitely don't want that, because to them, we are enemies who need to be eradicated. On the other hand, there is Putin and his inner circle, who flushed everything we plundered, stole, and accumulated through corruption down the toilet in a single year, and forced our children back from abroad. That is a problem."
So they are wondering: can we find some middle-of-the-road politician who would be palatable to the West—someone who could perhaps negotiate the lifting of sanctions—and quietly push him forward? Someone who wouldn't view us as enemies. In other words, the search for the next power structure is happening right now.
Eggert: If we look at Russian society today, it has retreated into internal emigration. People pretend to believe the authorities, or perhaps they have truly convinced themselves to believe them. Do you agree with this?
Guelman: My concept is that Russian society is infantile; it is childlike. There is a parent whose actions are viewed uncritically for a long time. He is always good; he always does the right thing. He gives money for sweets. Society needs to grow up. When the war started, everyone froze. The feeling that this will end soon, that one can just wait it out at the dacha or leave the country, definitely exists. I hope that by this autumn, everyone will realize that nothing can be waited out. The insidious part of this situation is that instead of declaring martial law and instituting drills, they are passing laws that covertly regulate the life of the country as a military camp.
Eggert: So what? Nobody took to the streets to protest.
Guelman: I think they are protesting with their feet—meaning, they are leaving.
Eggert: The fact that they are leaving plays right into Putin's hands. Those who could have protested have left or are leaving. Personally, I cannot imagine that people haven't heard anything at all about Irpin or Bucha, because, as you said yourself, YouTube is still working. There is no sense that society is shocked. Is this not an amoral society?
Guelman: Since 2014, people have been conditioned to believe that what matters is who is "ours" and who is "the enemy," rather than who is right or wrong. Right now, there are two working messages. For Putin, it is anti-Americanism. He latched onto a very real, existing global sentiment that you can find in Africa, in Italy, and elsewhere. Anti-Americanism is a real, living force. And people clung to it: "Maybe we are wrong, but at least they are ours." It’s a kind of protective, tribal response. This reality needs to be shattered.
Eggert: How do you shatter it? Let’s imagine the war ends with a Ukrainian victory, which means defeat for Russia. People—ranging from governors and vice-ministers to ordinary viewers of Channel One—will be forced to learn about Bucha, Irpin, and the murders of children. Will they also say, just like in 1945: "We didn't know, we are not to blame"?
Guelman: We are already hearing arguments about the guilt of a conventional "collective Putin." This is a fairly strong narrative because it is partially true. In 2011, people took to the streets to protest against Putin. Garry Kasparov reminded me that as early as 2014, he organized his first forum to explain to the European community just how dangerous Putin was, and nobody listened to him. Yet, around that same time in 2011, oil agreements were being signed with Putin, and people elsewhere were voting for Yanukovych.
So in reality, one can look at what is happening as a specific clique around Putin that first captured Russia. The guilt of the Russian people lies in their infantilism and weakness, not in them being villains. Therefore, from the position of being a victim, they will probably say: "We bear responsibility, but we are not guilty." I think a part of society will say exactly that. The point is that after the war, individual records will matter. Collective responsibility is obvious. There must be a dismantling of the system, payment of reparations, and trials. The cleansing must be material, not just falling to one's knees and saying, "Forgive us, Ukraine."
