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Host: Welcome to our audience. As you can see, we are joined today by Marat Guelman—former political strategist, current cultural figure, and sybarite. Marat, hello.
Marat Guelman: Good afternoon. I would argue the sybarite point, though. This year, it feels like I am launching a new project somewhere in the world every five days. I am constantly on the move. So, quite the contrary—I am a workhorse, a bee. An aesthetic bee.
Host: No arguments there. Why did the idea to meet again arise? Because, much like you, I suppose, when I saw President Kuchma at the parliamentary rostrum and subsequently heard about Denis Stilerman's initiative calling for a presidential absolutism, my hand immediately reached for the phone to dial Marat Guelman. We have seen this somewhere before. In a sense, you witnessed the re-election of President Kuchma. Now, you are witnessing what is unfolding as a new era of politics is supposed to be born in Ukraine, yet it consistently resembles something old. Regarding this initiative by Stilerman—I don't know if you've heard about it—he proposes returning to the presidential Constitution...
Guelman: Returning to a presidential Constitution, yes.
Host: Yes, essentially restoring presidential absolutism. It instantly reminded me of Valentina Tereshkova asking Putin to "zero out" his presidential terms. Frankly speaking, at a certain point, I even felt a sense of pity for President Zelensky. What risks and dangers has whoever advised him on this set in motion?
Guelman: Well, first of all, during wartime, it seems to me the President of Ukraine already possesses ample powers, precisely because a war is ongoing and he simultaneously serves as the Commander-in-Chief.
Host: Yes, Marat, and he isn't just the Supreme Commander-in-Chief...
Guelman: Exactly, exactly. Therefore, an initiative like this is an attempt to preserve those exact same powers for the post-war period. That is how I interpreted it. Why is this bad? I believe it is bad for everyone. The thing is, when Kuchma wielded substantial power, he simply couldn't tolerate the idea of anyone else possessing that same amount of authority later, which is why he initiated constitutional amendments to make it a more parliamentary republic. But he had his own motives. Today, the landscape is entirely different. Ukraine is moving—with difficulty and complexity, but moving nonetheless—toward the European Union. Consequently, such constitutional modifications act rather as a barrier to EU accession than an aid.
Host: Right.
Guelman: Yes. I observe how tortuous the process with the roadmap is in Montenegro, and Ukraine faces far more acute problems. Therefore, I don’t know, perhaps these are just some... meaning, to put it this way, I don't believe that the people proposing this genuinely comprehend the ramifications of such a decision. Because, on one hand, it won't help them retain power. Preserving authority... The thing is, I visit Ukraine and see, for instance, how the military operates. I want to say that the core strength of the Ukrainian army lies precisely in the fact that a vast amount of authority is decentralized to local levels rather than being concentrated with the Commander-in-Chief.
I’ve seen representatives of international industries arrive there, pitching their technical solutions, and these are integrated exceptionally rapidly precisely because there is no top-down over-centralization. Any centralization or concentration of power in the hands of the president acts as a signal that, in a certain sense, Putin has won—meaning he has successfully halted Ukraine's movement toward the European Union.
Host: Yes, and that is where all the risks lie. Will there be enough... I cannot say professionalism, wisdom, or experience, I will say intuition—because actors are inherently intuitive, and this intuition should serve as a stop-word for Zelensky. We assumed he would transform politics, that we would view politics as an art form rather than as vengeance, darkness, and brawling. By the way, you noted in an interview that war isn't politics, but it transforms everything. Treating war as the primary driver of politics is also a flawed ideology. Understandably, Zelensky was dragged into this game initiated by Putin. Was it a mistake? Evidently, it was Putin's mistake, much like it was a mistake made by the then-young politician Saakashvili, who succumbed to the provocation orchestrated by a seasoned Putin. Now, the exact same card is being played. What are the ramifications? I can surmise that a different game is afoot, where an attempt will be made to deceptively convince Zelensky that he is winning. For instance, President Lukashenko responded to his ultimatum by saying: "Fine, I will do as you request and shut down all possible technical structures." He even apologized to him. This is also a specific strategy. Where do the risks and threats lie? Or are we dealing with a scenario where there will be no military victory on the battlefield? And consequently, this war will now be pivoted into a political game, a political battle.
Guelman: First of all, I want to issue a disclaimer that I do not possess any exclusive inside intelligence compared to other people. Yes, there is a general understanding of how things are progressing. From my perspective, the core issue is not that Ukraine is winning, but that Russia is losing. And it is visible. Most importantly, Russia is a massive country with vast resources; it can lose under only one condition—when the war ceases to be popular within Russian society. It must be said that over the past two months, the Kremlin has lost. And it lost not so much on the battlefield—on the battlefield, everything appears to be stuck in the exact same place—but rather in the fact that the majority of segments within Russian society have emerged as opponents of the war.
Therefore, with this failure of Putin's, there is a strong urge to capitalize on it, a strong urge to label it a Ukrainian victory. From my point of view, the signing of documents will constitute the actual victory. Why? Because this Marshall Plan for Ukraine involves massive investments—not just European, but global investments—that await the country after the devastation to facilitate its revival. These investments are directly contingent upon whether documents are signed, and what those documents look like.
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Host: Speaking of which, I believe Putin stated yesterday: "We will sign absolutely anything, provided there is a desire." Did you hear that? It was stated literally.
Guelman: That is fantastic. So now the question hinges precisely on who will be signing these documents.
Host: Still, it was stated by Putin, it was stated by Putin nonetheless. "We will sign it, whether it's with the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament or anyone else." They already have responses prepared for every question. It is obvious they require a conclusion to this war. Equivalently, by the way, as Trump does, and as Ukraine does—everyone requires a conclusion to the war.
Guelman: Well, I would treat Putin’s words with far more caution or far less optimism than you do, because as I understand it, letting Ukraine go constitutes an absolute catastrophe for him. He will endeavor to entangle these signed documents with conditions. That is a highly critical aspect. I don't believe Zelensky requires any extraordinary powers for Ukraine's current domestic situation. Extraordinary powers were necessary for Zelensky back when the conversation revolved around, say, voluntarily relinquishing the territories they currently occupy. If he had done that, he would have been cursed, overthrown, and so on. Back then, if you recall, the conversation concerned a potential referendum—meaning he sought to shift a portion of the responsibility for that decision onto the population.
But in the current landscape, I don't see a necessity for extraordinary powers. What exists is entirely sufficient. I simply think that all these ongoing initiatives to modify power or the system of governance in Ukraine—whether pro or con, regarding additional powers—constitute a premature entry into tomorrow's electoral struggle. It seems to me that internally, people have already defeated and resolved the problem of Russia, and are now resolving the problem—a perfectly legitimate one—of domestic power within Ukraine. There are bound to be certain factions, opponents of the current administration, representing the past or the future. Therefore, I would say it is premature.
If someone were to ask for my advice, I would say: let’s institute a brief moratorium—say, for three months or six months—on initiatives modifying the system of governance in Ukraine. Any initiatives, in any direction. That is what I would say. This wouldn't prevent Zelensky’s rivals from preparing for the upcoming elections or promoting themselves, but I wouldn't alter the structural landscape of relations with Russia at this juncture.
Host: Right. Well, okay, but assuming that the focus is on preparing and signing certain documents seems improbable, because I see statements by Syrsky, who labels a new Russian offensive in northern Ukraine as highly realistic. By the way, he doesn't rule out an offensive against Kyiv and Chernihiv; I watched that interview. And we see how perilously close Russian troops are to Sumy. Furthermore, we comprehend that the Russian army continues its offensive and retains the advantage on the ground. In that case, what should we expect in the near future, in your view? The only historical parallel I can draw regarding Putin is with, I don't know, the palace coups that ousted Khrushchev, Gorbachev, or other political leaders. Is such an option viable? Is it possible that the old-guard security service officers will conclude that Putin is weak and they need to swap out the negotiator on their side?
Guelman: The question is strictly about the time lag. I believe Putin still has time. He will execute the elections now, and following the elections, he will enact certain unpopular domestic decisions that he is currently avoiding.
Host: Meaning, for example, he will announce a mobilization?
Guelman: Mobilization is the most extreme measure, but there is an entire array of options before that. It involves the confiscation of citizens' savings. They currently lack the capital to wage war and they lack human personnel—that is entirely accurate. But launching a mobilization is exceptionally risky for them right now. Therefore, I think they will initially pursue other tracks. They need to restructure their industry. They primarily manufactured offensive missiles; now they need to start constructing their own air defense systems.
So he will still attempt some form of escalation, including an effort to alter the situation on the front line. I believe this will be tied to a colossal volume of casualties. And following that, this disillusionment with the war, which is currently ubiquitous in Russia, will transform into a total rejection. Against that backdrop, not one, but a dozen or several dozen plots to oust Putin from his position will emerge. We know that there were, I believe, 38 assassination attempts against Hitler. Against Putin, as I understand it, there hasn't been a single one—nobody has even flinched.
Host: And you don't take Prigozhin’s march into account? You don't factor that in?
Guelman: Well, yes, Prigozhin... but the simple solution there was still targeting Putin directly. Yet Prigozhin was ultimately appealing to Putin; he was fighting against the Ministry of Defense, but he wanted to reach Putin to have a conversation with him. Here, however, individuals must emerge who have comprehended that Putin is the problem, and he must be removed.
I certainly wouldn't say this is a non-viable track. Furthermore, if we are talking about a horizon of a year or two, it is the only track. The only track is for certain individuals—even if via a friendly route, like with Khrushchev, sending him into retirement at some point, or perhaps via a harsher method—to conclude that he has lost his grip on reality, lost his capabilities, and consequently, the right to govern the country or manage this conflict. I don't see another way out in the short term.
A military defeat—a strict military defeat on the ground—is something I don't foresee, because they possess the nuclear button. They wield the weapon of blackmail. If tomorrow the Ukrainian army achieves massive success and Ukraine displays a refusal to sign a compromise treaty, he will say: "Well, okay, we were left with no alternative. We will deploy tactical nuclear weapons." Therefore, I believe that these successes on the front line coupled with a readiness to sign a normal treaty already constitute an existing defeat for Putin.
Another matter is that this does not resolve the ultimate question regarding Russia itself. We can envision the war concluding under Putin's rule. We can envision Ukraine securing conditions under which it can begin the revival of the country, its economy, and so forth under Putin's rule. But we cannot envision the threat of a subsequent war being dismantled under Putin's rule, or any internal transformations unfolding within Russian society under his rule. I think that a sudden demise of Putin—this thought, functioning as a hope, currently exists not only in your head and mine, but in the minds of the majority of Russians.
Host: Yes. And someone—Vitaly Portnikov, I believe—commenting on Sergei Ivanov’s funeral, noted that this constitutes the first funeral of Putin's immediate, closest circle. Well, that's understandable, yes. In this saga, there is one undeniable positive fact: Ukraine is eternal, whereas Putin, fortunately or unfortunately for himself, is not. Fine. But we recalled Khrushchev, and now let’s recall Gorbachev. He was also sent to Foros for a "vacation." And it seemed like the collapse of his career, the collapse of a vast Soviet Empire. Yet suddenly, Gorbachev receives the status of an honorary citizen of Berlin, advertising contracts, and is transformed into a European politician, highly popular in Europe. Sometimes, when observing how well-armed Ukraine has become, and how its military-industrial complex has modernized, you find yourself asking: "In whose interests is Putin operating?" He has brought us closer to Europe. In a sense, he has even rendered Europe dependent on Ukraine's high technologies. We all remembered that Korolev and Sikorsky are also Ukrainians. In that case, what outcome do you foresee? Demise is probably the absolute best thing that...
Guelman: Could transpire, exactly. But if I answer this question in passing—in whose interests? If we look closely, the primary beneficiary is China. It overcame its domestic economic crisis at Russia's expense. So China has been placed in a position resembling a global peacemaker, because there is an opinion that Putin is restrained from deploying tactical nuclear weapons solely by China.
Host: Yes, yes, they actually... yesterday they issued a statement, immediately calling for the resumption of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.
Guelman: Exactly, exactly. That is why they are the beneficiaries. On the whole, yes, Putin has inflicted the greatest amount of damage upon Russia itself. That is obvious. And if we look from a grand distance—if we close our eyes to the fact that so many human tragedies transpired as a result of this aggression, that people perished, which we cannot actually do—but if we look at this hypothetically from a detached, almost divine distance regarding who benefits and so forth, then yes, one can point to the awakening of Europe, America's retreat from the role of an absolute hegemon, the accelerated convergence of Ukraine with Europe, and its search for its own destiny.
In the end, everyone says that Ukraine has become a European Israel now. I spoke with individuals in Ukraine two and a half years ago who were complaining that they were mobilized and there was no rotation, yet today they say that when the war ends, they will remain in the military. It is a profession. It is a profession, something they know how to do well, something they enjoy doing. This represents a profound shift within society; what has transpired is highly fascinating. Yes.
From this standpoint, of course, Putin, in attempting to drag us backward, accelerated certain transformations that would have unfolded sooner or later anyway. I stand on the position that we do not know God's intent, but at the very least, we would prefer it to be realized with a minimum of human casualties. Whether Bashkiria should splinter off or not, I don't know, but I would prefer both processes to be bloodless.
Yesterday, when a discussion arose regarding whether the disintegration of the Russian Federation into several states is good or bad, I told them the question was framed incorrectly. The question must be framed like this: if someone wants to secede, are you prepared to restrain them by force? What is it? In Putin’s mind, which harbored this Orthodox union of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine—in Putin's mind, this was Ukraine seceding from Russia. And he resolved to halt this secession by force. Yes. This applies to everything.
I would say that we comprehend that Putin is not the entirety of the problem, but Putin is 90% of the problem. If the problem of Putin were somehow resolved, everything would become far simpler for us. Today, Ukrainians command the admiration of the majority of the global population. And if yesterday it was admiration for their strength and spirit, today it is also for how society has restructured itself, for their military victories, and this strategic reliance on technological advancement. I remember perfectly well Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s article, which very clearly articulated that the exit from this war can only be technological.
Host: A breakthrough, yes. By the way, they met yesterday. Zelensky invited Zaluzhnyi. They spoke, and clearly, Zelensky posed a natural question regarding potential elections this autumn. Zaluzhnyi confirmed that he intends to run. I don't know if Zelensky offered the position of Prime Minister under his presidency to Zaluzhnyi. Did they contemplate such scenarios? But frankly speaking, it seems to me that both Zaluzhnyi and Zelensky are, to use cinematic language, fading figures, don't you think? Or will we continue to exist within this military fairway, this military ideology, for some time?
Guelman: Well, they will, at the very least, remain pivotal players. But no, I think that for some time—perhaps even a long time—military figures will remain the primary politicians in Ukraine.
Host: Marat, military figures are important, as we noted; essentially, they transformed Ukraine into a new nation. But even taking the example of Israel, it doesn't automatically imply that military figures must occupy political offices. That is the point.
Guelman: It doesn't imply that, unquestionably, but it is ultimately a competitive struggle. Regarding the conversation you assume occurred yesterday concerning the Prime Minister's seat—as far as I know, that conversation happened earlier. Back when Kyrylo Budanov was positioned as the head of the office, it was believed that the head of the office, rather than the Prime Minister's seat, functions as a springboard to become the successor. I rely strictly on secular, public sources, but my sources indicate that Zelensky will not participate in the next presidential elections.
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Host: Wise. I believe that would be wise, yes.
Guelman: Yes. And his task is to ensure that the next president assumes office with his assistance, through his cooperation, and perhaps even his public, open endorsement. This model is what is being implemented down the line. Who are these individuals? Whether it will be Budanov or the current Minister of Defense—a direct military lineage—it will apparently definitely not be Zaluzhnyi anymore. Zaluzhnyi will pursue his own independent trajectory as an opponent of this handpicked successor of Zelensky’s. I want to say that such a model is possible, it seems to me, only after Zelensky successfully guides the process to the signing of a peace treaty with Russia.
Host: Right.
Guelman: Prior to that, I don't see a possibility. As I understand it, vacating his post without concluding this matter is an impossible scenario for him.
Host: Right. Well, here is what we see. Strikes against Russia continue quite successfully. "Flamingos" are reaching their targets; two more missiles reached Russia. And there is a surprising lull on the Russian side. No retaliatory strikes for now, although as I mentioned, intelligence reports indicate they are being prepared.
Guelman: Well, they are definitely preparing them. They want to... Meaning, a fine solution for Putin would be to demonstrate: "We haven't even started yet." Some new phase of escalation, but a non-nuclear one. Logically, tactical nuclear weapons could fit that bill. But for him, as I understand it, Beijing's prohibition is paramount. Without Beijing's support, neither Russia, nor Putin, nor any of this will survive. Therefore, do they possess the resources for this new escalation? That is the question. They have raised this degree of escalation several times already, and what can be a harsher response? What, hitting Kyiv's civilian infrastructure? Well, then, it seems to me, he will forfeit any chance of securing, I don't know, support or even mediation from Washington. But unquestionably, following the elections in Russia—which are in September—we should expect a serious attempt to alter the landscape of the war. I am an optimist, and I believe he faces a fiasco, and closer to the New Year, we will have a peace agreement.
Host: By this New Year. Yes, yes.
Guelman: Exactly, exactly.
Host: Well, that is a highly optimistic forecast. Fine. I think any war sooner or later concludes with a long-awaited peace. But what comes next? Have you ever contemplated the post-war world, borders, the new geopolitics, or the new culture of leadership that awaits us? Because judging by the transformations unfolding in anticipation of elections in France, Britain, and Germany, we see that a shift in vector will transpire there.
Guelman: Well, yes, it is clear that upon the conclusion of the war, Europe... The thing is, Europe remains the leader in the field of peace, in the field of constructing normal relations. Frankly speaking, I count on Germany becoming a new great power after the war concludes, because it possesses that specific latent resource. Europe—yes, life might become less comfortable for a time—but Europe, the European Union, will simultaneously become a military alliance. I think NATO has served its purpose; it is no longer as compelling as it used to be.
Next, I expect... I was recently in New York staging an exhibition, but I expect serious transformations within the US Republican Party. Trump has exhausted his intra-party support. Whether this means a party split or a shift in its trajectory remains to be seen. But the primary grievance against Trump right now inside America is that he befriended enemies and quarreled with friends.
Host: Yes.
Guelman: And such things cannot be permitted because they fracture the very foundations of the world order.
Host: And it's short-sighted, yes, it must be admitted, short-sighted.
Guelman: Exactly. And this is strictly an intra-party sentiment—meaning I was conversing not with opponents, not with Democrats, but precisely with Republicans. A transformation is underway there. I think the fork in the road is this: do we treat Russia as a massive North Korea, surround it with a ditch filled with crocodiles or a seven-meter wall, and live as we want? Or is Russia still a living organism that we wish to democratize, modify in some manner, and perhaps even...
Host: Fine, then... Forgive me, Marat, but it turns out a new triangle is being born right before our eyes. Kissinger spoke about a geopolitical balance of power between America, the USSR, and China. Now we see Kyiv, Berlin, and Beijing—a new triangle, with a New Silk Road, presenting new prospects and opportunities.
Guelman: Well, the question is only... the question...
Host: Yes, go ahead, sorry.
Guelman: It seems to me that Kyiv must ultimately be conceptualized as part of Europe. Kyiv is carving out its own highly vital position within Europe. That is important, but Ukraine as a whole will be part of Europe. All these domestic complexities with Bandera, with Poland, or with Hungary—they will all...
Host: And with corruption. With corruption, Marat. With corruption, yes.
Guelman: Yes. All these complexities will somehow be ironed out. But no, I believe the subsequent resolution will be dedicated precisely to resolving the Russian question. The thing is, Russian society or Russia's economy will be unable to exist after the war within this current system of sanctions. They will strive to have the sanctions lifted. I don't think an automatic rollback of sanctions will occur simply upon the cessation of the war. Or they will lift something, the most acute elements. But overall, the degradation of the Russian economy under the current scenario is a clinical fact.
Down the line, centrifugal forces will emerge inside Russia. I see it like this: say, Yakutia—a treasure trove of diamonds, but unable to sell them due to sanctions. If tomorrow they simply vote for secession, they immediately detach themselves from both the center and the sanctions, and a queue of De Beers and other buyers wishing to purchase their diamonds forms instantly. The same applies to Tatar oil, and so forth. That is, sanctions are highly likely to stimulate the secession of regions from this heavily sanctioned center.
This process will subsequently lead either to a literal fragmentation of the country into several states—the final collapse of the empire, as occurred previously—or to civil wars. This will be vital, at least for us, because Ukraine is situated right adjacent to this process. Amidst this, the primary objective will be the fortification of Europe. Vast sums of capital will be directed toward this, and I think Ukraine can legitimately claim a portion of these funds. On the whole, I see Kyiv—not Ukraine as a whole, but specifically the city of Kyiv—as a future capital of the world. It has become exceptionally famous; it has become popular. Furthermore, in Kyiv, unlike in Paris, for instance, there is room to build. There is space for investments. Kyiv has become international. Therefore, I foresee a massive surge for Kyiv. I hope we will participate in this somehow too.
Host: Yes, great. I don't doubt it. Especially since it was your concept originally—Victor Pinchuk’s contemporary art gallery. Yes, that... of course, your opponents argue that you whitewashed Pinchuk’s reputation by this mechanism, but nevertheless, to this day... justice.
Guelman: What is bad about... laundering a person’s reputation via this mechanism? I believe all politicians and businessmen should seek to launder their reputations in this manner, understand? By making a contribution to their native country, their city, and so on. The history of America demonstrates this beautifully—how it unfolded from the beginning of the last century, during the Prohibition era when everything was criminalized, how clans laundered their reputations. For instance, surrounding the MoMA museum—it was a literal art-laundering operation. But as a result, they constructed a fantastic museum, and their children are now perfectly upstanding citizens running legal businesses and paying taxes.
Host: You mentioned "children," and I recalled one celebrity child we haven't discussed. This will definitively be the last question. Why I recalled the gallery is because it stands as one of the few cultural centers where a massive queue of young, progressive, contemporary people stands—these new agents of change and agents of new influence. But regarding one celebrity child—it turns out you've heard the primary version of why Lukashenko flew to China. Kolenka completed his studies at a Chinese university.
Guelman: That isn't Kolenka; that is his other son.
Host: Oh, it’s... And I thought it was Kolya, and I even thought it was strange since he had studied at Moscow State University. Why would he need to, right? Ah. So he is an agent, Lukashenko’s agents of influence. Meaning he is preparing a Beijing representation that will be managed by one of his sons. Do I understand correctly?
Guelman: Yes. Yes. No. Lukashenko in this sense appears to be a parody character.
Host: But a strategist. Marat, quite a strategist, quite a strategist.
Guelman: Yes, yes, yes, yes. But yes, of course, unfortunately for Putin, it is too late to learn flexibility from him. Putin is done; he is a hostage. Putin and his inner circle must be swept away. That is one of the pivotal conditions for the onset of this new world.
Meanwhile, Lukashenko has managed to structure a situation where, under certain circumstances, he will emerge to play an important, positive role. This is exactly like Yabloko, which everyone in Russia criticized for constantly compromising with the authorities. Right now, they can play an important role, because in the elections, people who are against the war can cast their votes for Yabloko. And if it suddenly turns out that a vast number votes for them, that will be a verdict against Putin. Right now, we believe that in one single move, Yabloko can redeem all its past compromises with the authorities for which we criticized them.
Host: Yes, a golden share, so to speak. But there is one way, Marat, there is one way. And Malofeev suggested this method of halting to Putin. Right now, when Zelensky has managed to flatten regions of Russia, Putin could say: "Well, okay, you are strong, let’s finally talk." One could display such fatherly wisdom, if you will, or is Putin incapable of that?
Guelman: Well, it seems to me you are overestimating him. He isn't a fool, of course, but his brain is clogged and filled with such a volume of garbage. For him, positioning himself on equal footing with Zelensky in this manner is utterly impossible; he cannot even conceive it. You know, it closely resembles... we once read Gabriel García Márquez's “The Autumn of the Patriarch” as a work of fiction. It feels to me that Putin is just one step away from becoming that character in its pure form.
In Latin America, individuals were found who knew how to limit the patriarch's world. To construct a massive bunker, populate it with some generals and prime ministers, and let all of this... let him issue commands, and let these commands dissolve somewhere. To create a hermetic bunker where he would simply fade away, but without destroying everything surrounding him in the process.
Host: Yes, although someone recently attributed... Yes, I want to say that there are massive hopes now for transformations within Russian society—massive hopes.
Guelman: Well, who is attributing this phrase to whom? Berezovsky allegedly told Putin after the inauguration—or, by the way, Sobchak himself: "Volodya, just don't turn into a bronze monument." But evidently, it isn't given to everyone. He pursued precisely that trajectory. Marat, I am incredibly grateful to you for the opportunity to hear your perspective. If events indeed develop as rapidly as your positive forecast predicts, I hope we will speak very soon about victory and congratulate the entire world on its salvation. Why skimp on grand terms?
Marat Guelman: Slava Ukraini.
Host: Heroiam slava. Thank you immensely, and see you soon.
