Host: Turkey currently serves as the primary official venue for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. What elements of these talks stand out to gallerist and political analyst Marat Guelman? We ask him right now. Hello, Marat.
Marat Guelman: Good afternoon. Hello.
Host: Let's begin by outlining how you view this negotiation process. Looking at the delegation where Vladimir Medinsky serves as a key representative, do you see a team that actually arrived with a mandate to negotiate a resolution?
Guelman: Absolutely not. In fact, neither delegation arrived in Istanbul with the intent to finalize a comprehensive peace deal right now.
These negotiations are largely a tactical tribute paid to Donald Trump. Trump advanced the concept that if a 30-day ceasefire were established, forcing the parties to communicate, restarting active hostilities afterward would prove difficult. The logic assumed that even if an agreement wasn't reached within 30 days, the pause would extend to 60 days—ceasing fire while talks continued indefinitely.
Putin viewed that proposition as strategically disadvantageous and torpedoed the core idea. However, wishing to avoid alienating Trump or turning him against Moscow, Putin maintains the appearance of engaging in alternative negotiations.
President Zelenskyy similarly harbors no illusions that these specific talks will produce a breakthrough. Yet he cannot refuse to participate, as doing so would allow Putin to claim that Ukraine rejects peace. Thus, Ukraine sends its team to present its baseline positions.
The demands presented by Medinsky—on Putin's direct instructions—are demonstratively unachievable. This goes beyond demanding the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from territories Moscow has failed to occupy military. The central demand requires Ukraine to effectively surrender core elements of its sovereignty: limiting its armed forces, altering domestic language legislation, and adopting measures that restrict its independence relative to Russia.
Additionally, there is a subtle demand regarding political prisoners: proposing that if Ukraine releases pro-Russian political figures, Russia will reciprocate. Putin's underlying objective remains unchanged: to achieve political control over Ukraine through diplomatic pressure and leverage via Trump when military means fail.
Host: It seems Putin receives flawed intelligence suggesting Ukraine's domestic political situation is on the verge of collapse, leading him to believe President Zelenskyy will lose authority within months.
Marat, you may have noticed that most members of the Ukrainian delegation wore military uniforms. Was that coincidental?
Guelman: That was a deliberate choice. From a practical standpoint, setting aside the political grandstanding, humanitarian exchanges—such as prisoner swaps and the return of fallen soldiers—are being negotiated. Those practical military-to-military details are best handled directly by personnel in uniform. While broader political declarations remain empty, technical exchanges regarding prisoners and children require direct military coordination.
Host: You have worked with numerous Russian political figures over the years and understand the internal dynamics of the state apparatus. Do you know Vladimir Medinsky personally?
Guelman: Of course.
Host: What characterizes him as a political figure?
Guelman: He fits Robert Musil's concept of "a man without qualities."
We were originally introduced by the writer Viktor Erofeyev at a birthday gathering. At the time, Medinsky wanted to become a novelist. He had worked in public relations—a status he viewed as lacking societal prestige—and sought to establish himself as a public intellectual within the state apparatus. He pursued that trajectory systematically.
He achieved notable career advancement because very few figures within the cultural sphere earn Putin's complete personal trust. Unlike ideological figures like Alexander Prokhanov or Zakhar Prilepin, who hold specific personal convictions that might conflict with sudden shifts in the official party line, Medinsky functions as an entirely adaptable operative. He shifts seamlessly alongside official policy.
This mirrors the friction between Vladimir Solovyov and independent Z-bloggers: state media loyalists like Solovyov pivot instantly with every directive from the Kremlin, whereas ideological commentators sometimes resist sudden strategic shifts.
Medinsky is fundamentally pragmatic. When he rewrites history textbooks, he does not personally believe the historical distortions he publishes. Regarding the myth of the 28 Panfilov Guardsmen, he stated openly that even if the event was fabricated, the state requires the myth.
As the Kremlin phased out its reliance on independent political strategists and economists, Medinsky emerged as one of the few figures within the cultural-ideological sphere whom Putin trusts completely.
Host: Comparing the current Istanbul talks with previous rounds, a notable absence is Roman Abramovich, while figures like Kirill Dmitriev have also faded from view. Does this shift signal that figures capable of brokering informal compromises are no longer required by the Kremlin?
Guelman: Precisely. Individuals capable of negotiating actual compromises are not wanted by the Kremlin today.
During the initial phase of the war, when Moscow realized its rapid military objective had failed, figures like Abramovich were utilized to explore potential settlement terms. Later, when Trump launched his initial peace initiatives, figures like Dmitriev were engaged to test messaging.
Today, Putin is not seeking a negotiated compromise. His primary objective is managing perceptions: ensuring Trump perceives him as open to peace while framing Zelenskyy as obstinate, and presenting symmetrical "memorandums."
In reality, there is no symmetry. While Ukraine signals flexibility regarding starting talks from the current line of control without formally recognizing territorial annexations, Moscow demands structural domestic concessions from Kyiv.
I can conceive of an independent Ukraine enduring temporary territorial losses as a painful compromise, but I cannot conceive of a sovereign Ukraine accepting domestic legislative restrictions, military caps, and election parameters dictated by Moscow.
The positive takeaway from these exchanges is that European security assistance to Ukraine will be credited toward NATO defense spending targets. Accounting for aid to Ukraine within national NATO defense percentage targets provides European governments with a compelling rationale to sustain military spending.
A fundamental shift in the conflict will require changes either on the battlefield—such as the outcome of seasonal military operations—or shifts within European domestic politics. Only a rebalancing of these external factors will force the Kremlin to consider a genuine ceasefire.
Host: Turning south to Moldova, the country faces upcoming parliamentary elections on September 28th amid intense political activity and border scrutiny. How do you evaluate the current situation inside Moldova?
Guelman: The September 28th parliamentary elections represent a critical juncture for Moldova, as Kremlin intervention reaches unprecedented levels.
Having failed to secure rapid control over Ukraine, Moscow seeks to achieve a non-military political capture of Moldova to demonstrate regional influence. Last year, Moscow adjusted energy pricing for Moldova to match broader European market rates, resulting in utility costs quadrupling for average citizens.
Concurrently, Moscow funds multiple political vectors, notably led by Ilan Shor and former president Igor Dodon, who operate openly in alignment with the Kremlin. Shor manages his "Pobeda" political bloc directly from Moscow, while Dodon maintains explicit ties with Russian state officials.
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These factions are challenging the ruling Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), led by President Maia Sandu. PAS secured power on a strong anti-corruption platform, holding a parliamentary majority in a parliamentary republic. However, governing alone through four years marked by post-pandemic recovery and the economic spillovers of the war in Ukraine—factors outside Chisinau's control—has concentrated public economic frustration directly onto the ruling party.
Recognizing that PAS is unlikely to secure an absolute majority again, the Kremlin is deploying multiple political factions to capture parliament.
In response, Moldovan authorities are taking steps to disrupt illicit financial conduits feeding these political campaigns—including stopping coordinated groups of travelers carrying individual legal limits of cash into the country.
Similarly, state regulators are acting against media outlets funded by Shor that violate campaign finance laws, though these measures are framed by critics as restrictions on press freedom. President Sandu faces a difficult balancing act.
Host: President Sandu's recent presidential election victory was narrow, indicating that the broader struggle for Moldova's European integration is just beginning.
Guelman: Absolutely. In a parliamentary republic, parliamentary elections carry far greater weight than presidential ones, as parliament forms the executive government.
Host: Are there viable pro-European political forces operating alongside Sandu's party?
Guelman: There is an emerging political grouping worth watching: the "Alternative" movement. This includes figures like Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban, former prosecutor general Alexandr Stoianoglo, and former prime minister Ion Chicu.
While opposing PAS, key figures within this group publicly condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. However, their political platform emphasizes pragmatic neutrality, advocating for direct negotiations with Moscow to secure lower energy prices.
While linguistic divisions between Romanian and Russian speakers are minimal in daily life, they become prominent during campaign cycles as voters seek representative political figures.
Because PAS governed without forming coalitions over the past four years, establishing a working parliamentary coalition between PAS and moderate alternative factions after the election will require significant political effort.
The political choices of the Moldovan diaspora will prove decisive once again, as they did during the presidential vote and the EU integration referendum. While PAS is unlikely to secure an outright majority, preventing a pro-Kremlin coalition depends on whether pro-European factions can form a functional coalition following the September vote.
Host: Thank you very much, Marat, for joining us and sharing your analysis. Our time has concluded. I encourage our viewers to like this video and subscribe to our channels. Goodbye.
Guelman: Thank you. Goodbye.
