Marat Guelman: Why Image of the Future Is Stronger Than Money

Host: Hello, you are watching the program “Opinion” on UNTV. Can culture change society? Where does art end and politics begin? And is cultural dialogue capable of preserving peace where conventional diplomacy fails to yield results? Today, we discuss this and much more with the renowned gallerist, essayist, and collector Marat Guelman. Hello, Marat Aleksandrovich. I am delighted to welcome you back to the UNTV broadcast.

Marat Guelman: Good afternoon. You can just call me Marat.

Host: Just Marat, then. Thank you—that will save us some broadcasting time.

Guelman: Excellent.

Host: Let us dive straight into the political dimension of current events, particularly in Moldova. I am certain you are aware that the Moldovan Prime Minister has resigned. Many attribute this to the ruling pro-European party attempting to reboot its format of governance and power as a whole. In your view, can and should a ruling party—even a pro-European one—openly admit that its system periodically malfunctions? And isn't it dangerous to reboot the format of power at a time when hybrid attacks from Russia persist and, moreover, are highly likely to escalate to a completely new level?

Guelman: On one hand, these are generalized questions. Naturally, a reboot is necessary, and naturally, one must strive to be effective. However, the situation faced by PAS (Action and Solidarity Party) is such that your successes concurrently act as the source of your problems. After all, a single-party government, where the president and the ruling party bear absolute responsibility for everything that transpires, is a highly complex predicament. When we discussed this previously, we all noted that it would be wise to share this responsibility with other pro-European politicians available in Moldova. In the end, crises are inevitable. We know that the Prime Minister and the President parted ways under circumstances that perhaps weren't the most amicable. But we must evaluate how they navigate these crises. I would say it is rather surprising that no such public crises erupted until this very moment.

Host: And all of this is unfolding against the backdrop of what I see as a pivotal milestone for Moldova that occurred just two days ago. The thing is, we are currently present in Brussels. We established the Anti-War Committee, opened a gallery in Brussels, and secured a permanent mandate to attend sessions in the European Parliament. Two days ago, we attended the speeches delivered by the European Parliament rapporteurs on Moldova and Ukraine. While the report on Ukraine raised numerous questions, the Moldovan section featured a highly fascinating overview regarding how integration with Transnistria is progressing, and how the Moldova–Transnistria–Odesa trade triangle operates. On the whole, all six negotiation chapters have been opened. Furthermore, it was noted that Moldova has fulfilled its commitments to the European Parliament regarding legislative reforms in 24 out of 36 specific sectors.

Host: Marat, I want to open a small parenthesis here. We have heard numerous words of support in both the European Parliament and the European Commission. Resolutions backing the European integration of the Republic of Moldova have been adopted repeatedly. Yet, in your view, does the fact that we have detached from Ukraine at a certain point and will pursue this track independently accelerate our progress or not? It is worth noting that we will not be able to integrate via an accelerated fast-track regime. This became clear relatively recently, although pro-Russian forces had likely pinned their hopes on it to some extent. Still, if we proceed independently of Ukraine, does this increase our chances of fulfilling the promises heard prior to the parliamentary campaign—specifically, that we would see definitive concrete steps by 2028? What are your forecasts?

Guelman: Currently, the roadmap points to 2028–2030. This means that by the end of 2028, Moldova must fully comply with its regulatory frameworks. The situation surrounding the judicial system remains an outstanding issue. It must undergo a specialized compliance audit, much like in the banking system; it has to clear the European Union's screening mechanism. Furthermore, economic integration—not political, but economic integration of Transnistria—must be finalized. This means that Transnistrian enterprises must fully transition into Moldova's taxation system. Economic integration is framed as a mandatory precondition for EU accession, but political integration is not. This is a crucial distinction, because many used to argue that EU accession would remain impossible until the Transnistrian crisis was fully resolved politically.

Host: Yes, they expected the signing of some document to that effect, something tangible...

Guelman: Exactly. There are specific milestones regarding economic integration and the incorporation of local enterprises into Moldova’s tax grid.

Host: And that is already underway. So, Moldova is on track to complete everything by 2028, and the European Union will execute full integration by 2030.

Guelman: Precisely. Furthermore, even today, the European Union covers a quarter of Moldova's military budget—25%. That means half a billion euros is already flowing through specialized programs. I would say that Ukraine finds itself much further behind. But the issue is also that there are at least three EU member states that, entirely separate from the report delivered by the rapporteur on Ukraine, maintained their own distinct grievances. These are Poland, Slovakia, and I don't recall who spoke third. Therefore, I would say that going independently is our only viable chance. And this was fundamentally... Of course, Ukraine is alarmed because they believe that if Moldova is let through independently now, things will become exceptionally difficult for them down the line, to put it that way. But as of two days ago, it was officially recorded that Moldova is closest to the goal—even though Montenegro, where I reside, is also on the accession track.

Host: Yes. Perhaps when comparing the tempo of implementing reforms and aligning our legislation with European standards. To wrap up this section: when we discuss potential candidates or potential shifts within Moldova’s ruling party, I want to note right away that we are recording this conversation several days prior to its broadcast. This is vital because the situation shifts rapidly. I really liked your observation regarding the necessity of bearing responsibility. Ultimately, with less than two years left before the presidential election, do you think the pro-European party needs to take absolute control of the country's governance—meaning the government—and field a candidate who is a strict party loyalist, or should it adopt a technocratic model and field a candidate who isn't necessarily a member of the PAS party?

Guelman: This is heavily influenced by the fact that Maia Sandu is running for a second term, meaning she needs to groom a successor within the party for the subsequent presidential elections. In essence, the position of Prime Minister and the position of Mayor of Chisinau are the two offices most advantageous for launching a politician who, tomorrow or when the time comes, can emerge as her successor. A successor in the sense of being the presidential candidate representing PAS. Therefore, this logic dictates that the Prime Minister must come from within the party ranks. Failing that, things will become exceptionally difficult because the distance between Maia and everyone else is colossal. This is another success that transforms into a problem. Everyone will inevitably compare a new candidate to Maia and conclude that she is a towering political figure—far more substantial than the people surrounding her. Consequently, I wouldn't even debate it; I would simply seek a Prime Ministerial candidate from within PAS. Conversely, however, we are forming a new government. And within that new government, I would attempt to integrate those exact technocrats you mentioned to the absolute maximum. Furthermore, I would position them at the Deputy Prime Minister level, rather than standard ministerial slots. But we must note that I am looking at this somewhat from the outside.

Host: That is highly important. Your perspective from the outside, how you see things, and your experience regarding political engineering and Russian politicians are vital. As I mentioned earlier, one gets the impression that Russia will also reboot the format of its lobbyists here in Moldova. Even though some segments of society might have previously trusted politicians like Dodon, Ceban, or Shor, I feel Russia is highly likely preparing something fresh or some new project here in Moldova ahead of the presidential election. I am very interested in your take on this.

Guelman: We joke that Kiriyenko has organized a beauty pageant in Moldova. Cherchez la femme. They resolved that since Maia was elected, they need to look for a woman, and they announced a conventional beauty contest. Igor Dodon is currently viewed as a liability rather than a viable candidate. He is a problem because it is exceptionally difficult to dislodge him from the top slot. Yet, by remaining in that prime position, he ensures that a segment of the Left and the Moscow-oriented forces simply sabotages the efforts—and by sabotaging Dodon, they effectively sabotage the Kremlin’s initiatives as well. In that sense, Dodon is a "useful idiot," to use the technical term. He acts rather as an asset for PAS, though he might not realize it himself. I believe that a crucial turning point—since we have entered the realm of political components—is that this alternative coalition has fractured. I think we need to scrutinize it very closely and perhaps locate someone within its ranks to integrate into the new government.

Host: And within that alternative, who do you think that could be?

Guelman: You know, I prefer not to name names. It turns out that if I point to someone, it ceases to be an expert opinion and looks like I am interfering. At least, I am frequently confronted with that accusation, so I...

Host: I don't know who confronts you with that, but your opinion and your vision are highly vital, so we can proceed.

Guelman: I would put it this way: I think the current Mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban... A formidable alternative needs to be mounted against him for the city, yet at the same time, an offer needs to be extended to him because he...

Host: Could be useful, in your view?

Guelman: Yes, he is a promising politician. He sits in opposition to Maia, but that opposition could be rendered more constructive. Despite him formally declining to participate in the Prime Ministerial consultations, once the Prime Minister is appointed, he and Maia Sandu could at least consult with him regarding certain ministerial positions. On the whole, this insularity of PAS—even as a powerful force—presents a major problem, and Europeans are pointing it out. For example, the lack of local government involvement in the EU integration system was one of the explicit criticisms raised. Europe operates in a completely different way; it isn't structured with a president at the top and everything trickling down in a rigid pyramid. Europe is built from the bottom up, starting with local authorities, upon which federal power is structured.

Host: Marat, I suggest we take a brief commercial break here, and we will absolutely resume our discussion in a few minutes on UNTV.

(Commercial break)

Host: We are back in the studio. Today, we are speaking with the prominent gallerist and collector Marat Guelman. Prior to the break, you stopped at the point where you noted that Europe is structured a bit differently. I have a question from a slightly different angle. For years, Russia forced Moldova to operate in a reactive mode, constantly responding to crises—this applies to Gagauzia, where the uncertainty surrounding elections drags on, and I am certain you are aware of it, as well as the Transnistrian region. Once again, winter will arrive abruptly, and it remains unclear through what mechanism Russia will supply or bill them for gas. Given that for years we were forced to handle these specific crises and couldn't focus cleanly on our European development—how do European officials react to this? Do they realize that Moldova is, to some extent, held back simply because it must constantly respond to crises engineered by Russia?

Guelman: Not only do they factor it in, but they openly state that the war's impact on Moldova's economy is severe and destructive. In this sense, we must harbor no illusions: as long as the war against Ukraine continues, we will not be able to detach completely. Yet at the same time, Moldova becomes even more vital to the European Union precisely because of this. Therefore, while we cannot play a pivotal role in resolving this global crisis, we can at least fulfill our part—acting as a staging ground for the European Union. We manifest complete political alignment with the European Union and with Ukraine. And we pay a certain price for that. The European Union factors this in, including through their economic support. Consequently, I believe we have no alternative track. We are far too small a country to resolve this issue independently.

But the fact that we are moving forward consistently—and, by the way, the European Union highly evaluated the step of exiting the economic union with Russia amidst all of this—is a rather bold move, despite facing domestic criticism. On the whole, Moldova today serves as a prime example of how the image of the future is stronger than money. No matter how much the European Union assists Moldova, it cannot spend the sums that the Kremlin pours into elections. Consequently, the fact that Moldova, despite this, has chosen a pro-European government several years in a row demonstrates that the image of the future matters more than capital.

And that is the fundamental problem for Russia as a whole, both for domestic consumption and external relations: what image of the future does Putin sketch out? Let us imagine a country agrees to sit in Russia's shadow; aside from money, there is nothing. He offers the past; he offers a return to the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire. What does Putin offer? We are witnessing it, unfortunately, in Ukraine: strikes on residential buildings, hundreds of casualties every single day.

Host: Speaking of which, I wanted to ask you: while Ukraine is making strides in launching strikes against Russia's energy facilities and infrastructure, strikes on civilian infrastructure inside Ukraine have intensified, as has been the case throughout these past four years. What is Putin attempting to prove by this? Is he trying to demonstrate something to the global community, or is he showing Russians that people should fear him, otherwise this is what happens? What is the rationale?

Guelman: He is wounded, of course. The thing is, the situation on the front line is not merely poor for Russia because their offensive has stalled. Today, right before our eyes, the war is changing; the type of warfare is transforming, and they are losing.

Host: So this strategy of Russian warfare is driven by sheer desperation?

Guelman: Analysts focus on the border, tracking who advanced a hundred meters in either direction, but one must look at the human casualties sustained by the Russian army versus the Ukrainian army. We see a ratio of eight Russian soldiers killed for every single Ukrainian soldier. That is a defeat. It may be a deferred defeat, delayed by a year, but the verdict is already sealed.

He is undoubtedly rushing because his hopes are pinned on Trump. Trump is an animal highly inspired by material incentives; he can be bought, in the broadest sense, understand? And Putin is offering the most lucrative cooperation possible in exchange for Trump applying pressure on Ukraine to force it to accept their terms. The issue is that Trump's time is running out. Even before his presidential term concludes, he could lose his majority in Congress as early as this autumn, which would strip him of the capacity to make decisions. Therefore, for Putin, this window until mid-autumn is the period when he believes he can easily alter the landscape of the war and push Ukraine toward a de facto capitulation.

I think that is an illusion. I think they have fallen into their own trap. The thing is, you cannot engage in propaganda without becoming infected by that very propaganda. You blast out this signal, it circulates through the media, then it returns to you via media monitoring, and you read the exact narratives you pushed out yourself, assuming it constitutes objective intelligence. Therefore, I believe that the inefficiency of this administrative system—much like within their gas stations—extends to their perception of the actual situation as it stands. Today, Putin does not possess complete data, not because it isn't delivered to him, but because the Kremlin has distorted the information space to such an extent that he receives it within a false worldview.

I think that Ukrainian society has transformed completely. This is a highly fascinating moment. Two years ago, I spoke with a high-ranking officer who told me: "We were mobilized, but it would be good to have some rotation; it's unfair that we haven't been rotated since the start of the war." My understanding is that the new Minister of Defense is executing certain changes regarding this, regarding rotations. This exact same man, when I was in Ukraine two months ago, told me: "When the war ends, I will remain in the military."

Host: Wow.

Guelman: "This is my profession. I know how to do this exceptionally well. I am compensated handsomely for it. We are currently assisting the Norwegians test their weapons directly on the battlefield." I want to emphasize that Ukraine has become a potent military power—comparable to Israel. People have begun to perceive themselves as warriors, treating it explicitly as a profession. If initially it started as "we will defend the country and then return to civilian life," now they say that war is a profession. Russia isn't going anywhere, even if the fighting stops, and they will need to defend themselves, Europe, and the world. This shift in sentiment is not shown to Putin in his briefing portfolios.

Host: Marat, I suggest we touch upon another equally vital topic. You spoke about defenders. I want to pivot slightly toward the defense of our information space, our cultural space, because I promised you we would discuss culture today. I must ask you: recently, our Ministry of Culture has begun openly publishing lists of Russian artists who are undesirable in Moldova. This can be interpreted in any way. In your view, what criteria can genuinely serve as indicators or a selection process for artists who might be undesirable here in Moldova? Is it because they don't speak out against the war, because they don't condemn Putin's actions, or because they performed somewhere where their stance became obvious? What criteria would truly be comprehensible to our Moldovan society? Because the ban targeted figures like Leonid Agutin or the band Nochnye Snaipery—people whom Moldovans listen to, it must be admitted.

Guelman: I am not aware of the details. I just want to say that the very fact of openness is unsavory, because lists have always existed.

Host: Right.

Guelman: It’s just that previously they were closed, and now they are open. And you and I can, for instance, as you are doing now, criticize it and say: "You shouldn't have banned Agutin." I am not saying whether they should have or shouldn't have; I am using it as an example. Open lists can be contested. Someone can say: "You banned me by mistake; look, I didn't travel to Crimea, I didn't do this or that." And they will be told: "Okay, thank you, we are crossing you off." But if it's a closed list, you don't know where to appeal.

Host: Right.

Guelman: But one must bear in mind that the country is defending itself. And we saw it during the recent elections: performances by artists function as a political tool.

Host: So it turns out that what matters is who brings these artists here? What political coloring lies behind it all?

Guelman: Used to bring them, because if they are banned, bringing them is no longer an option.

Host: Right.

Guelman: But I want to put it this way: we can imagine that tomorrow, in the future, when we are confident in ourselves and when these aggressive attacks from Russia cease, we will dismantle these lists.

Host: Right.

Guelman: And okay, let them come. What of it? For example, we just had a discussion regarding Valery Gergiev. And we say: "We, the Anti-War Committee of Russia, are maximally opposed." Meanwhile, at the Opera, they say: "In principle, yes, well, of course, but do you truly think so poorly of the citizens that upon hearing his music, they will become supporters of Putin?" In a different, peaceful environment, I would say that compiling lists is a bad Soviet tradition.

Host: Well, okay, but someone who actively campaigns for the aggression, or appears and travels to Crimea, appearing at events wearing the Z-ribbons—that is obvious.

Guelman: No, I am saying that when there is no threat, no danger, one can view this more calmly.

Host: Right.

Guelman: And there, for example, I am confident that America does not track those who criticize Trump. Two months ago, I had a major exhibition of my works in Chelsea, New York. A strong country that is secure can afford a cultural performance...

Host: By any artists?

Guelman: By any artists. A pre-war or borderland situation dictates something else. I want to note that what is far more interesting here is the openness of the new ministry, which is very refreshing. They have stopped acting like important personas who decide the fates of the world, and simply report on what they are doing today, what they did yesterday—issuing these small reports. The new minister acts as a genuine servant of the people. This is highly interesting. I don't know, one could inquire about the opinion of the former Prime Minister as well, because such an embarrassment occurred with Mr. Munteanu, which fell squarely under the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture. But that's not what I mean.

Marat, I want to ask you: in your view, what do the new Russian artists sing about, or what do they carry within themselves—this new generation that opposes the war, and we all seemingly understand this, even though they don't state it loudly and clearly? And can these new young artists become a community that, sooner or later, will assume collective guilt for what Putin has perpetrated in Ukraine?

Guelman: Perhaps guilt belongs to the next generation, whereas this generation faces a highly critical task. On one hand, the so-called "Meta-Russia" is taking shape—a community of individuals who disagreed with Putin and left. On the other hand, interaction and communication are preserved with the youth who remained inside Russia. The thing is, we held a meeting yesterday, and we were presenting data because on September 10, the European Parliament will host a hearing regarding the situation with society in Russia, regarding what is unfolding inside Russia today. In preparing for this event, we discussed the fact that to this day, in the VKontakte chats and other Russian networks, the top slots are occupied by those musicians who left and who maintain an open anti-war stance.

Therefore, our mission right now is very simple—it is to preserve this anti-war resource within society. I agree with those who argue that anti-war sentiment today is not held by the majority of Russians—that, unfortunately, the majority of Russians support Putin. But those who do not support him constitute a large number, understand? Twenty-five percent of citizens is a vast number of people. And one must work with them in some manner. As for processing what occurred and assuming guilt—that is a reflective process that will likely unfold after everything concludes. At the very least, if we draw parallels with Germany, it all happened in earnest there around 1958, and cultural figures participated in it: Bertolt Brecht, the Vienna Actionists, the letters of Thomas Mann. That was a serious process in which people of culture played an essential role. But that process transpired entirely after the conclusion of the war.

Host: I want to talk to you about the Art Basel exhibition, which took place on the banks of the Rhine, as you told me shortly before our conversation began. Artists from Moldova, Ukraine, and other countries ended up adjacent to one another there. Can it be asserted that culture is currently accomplishing more than any diplomacy, even backchannel diplomacy?

Guelman: I would put it this way: it can accomplish more. Today, the first two vital steps have been taken. This year, Moldova is participating in the Venice Biennale for the very first time. Pavel Brăila executed his project. Concurrently, Moldovan artists are participating in Art Basel today. These are two major milestones: if the Venice Biennale is the premier non-commercial international event in the field of art, Art Basel is the premier art market, the main commercial event where the entire world and all collectors converge. And yes, I must note that while the Ukrainian booth and the Moldovan booth sat in different territories, the artists constantly visited one another and interacted. I am glad I had a hand in this. We exhibited four Moldovan artists at Art Basel: Mihai Țăruș, Victor Guțu, Tudor Zbârnea, and Tatiana Fiodorova. I would say that, at the very least, Moldova's participation was witnessed and recorded. The majority of collectors stopped at our booth at some point. And I think the artists returned to Moldova inspired. This represents a single space where Picasso sits here, Malevich sits there, and Țăruș sits right alongside them. It turns out he is a student of Sterligov, and Sterligov was a student of Malevich. These are all highly vital connections. We are entering Europe even before becoming members of the European Union. And that is paramount.

Host: On that note, if you permit, let us take a break. We will absolutely continue this topic regarding what we bring to Europe in terms of our culture, our desire to develop, and to develop our artists as well. Stay tuned to UNTV. We will resume shortly.

(Pause)

Host: We are back after a short pause. Let me remind you, today we are conversing with Marat Guelman. Marat, that is a highly fascinating thought—that we will enter Europe, or rather, we are already present there far earlier than all the loud announcements and ratified declarations. In your view, what has changed for artists, including artists from Ukraine and Moldova, after 2022? And on a broader scale, within the global cultural community, how vital is it to instantly manifest one's anti-war civic stance?

Guelman: The first question is highly important. The thing is, prior to 2022, all artists from the so-called post-Soviet nations were viewed by the world as Russian artists. I walk into the Centre Pompidou alongside Bernard, the director of the Centre Pompidou, examining the collections in the Russian art section, and there you have Boris Mikhailov or Sergey Anufriev—these are Ukrainian artists. With the onset of the war, it is highly vital that an understanding has finally emerged that there is Ukrainian art, Moldovan art, and while Russian art hasn't vanished either, these belong to distinct nations. They possess separate artistic environments that generate their own signals. Today, we can debate how Ukrainian art differs from Russian art, and so on. In short, the first aspect is that we emerged on the map due to the war. If previously they said: "Well, on the whole, they are Russian," today saying that is no longer possible. And that is crucial.

Second, naturally, this so-called integration requires effort, and these efforts are supported from the other side. This is also highly vital, because, for example, at that same Basel exhibition, practically all the Moldovan artists received invitations to stage exhibitions in Berlin, Belgrade, and Brussels. It matters that a process is starting. Art, after all, is a personal thing. It isn't a country that is exhibited; specific individuals speak out. In Venice, by the way, a highly fascinating event occurred during the opening of the Moldovan pavilion. The Vice Mayor of Venice told me, as I was noting something like "Moldovan culture": "We know Moldovan culture. In our Piazza San Marco, we have two cafés—that is the most essential location in all of Venice. A person who travels to Venice must absolutely drink a cup of coffee in Piazza San Marco at one of these cafés. Orchestras perform there. Both of our orchestras are from the Chisinau Philharmonic."

Host: You know, a highly interesting question arises here. Why does our society—I mean the average citizen—fail to know its own heroes, fail to know its own people who carry our culture to so many cities and countries around the world? In your “Moldovan Manifesto,” you propose looking at Moldova not through the prism of its economic state, but through its cultural potential. So why do we, Moldovans, underestimate our cultural potential?

Guelman: That is a question directed at you, not at me. I think that perhaps we find ourselves in a difficult economic situation, and a person preoccupied with securing bread thinks less about culture. In a way, that is likely the answer to your question. But what is highly fascinating is that history consists not only of positive events, but of negative ones as well. And still, if a creative energy exists, it feeds on that as well. The project I executed concerned... I think this is highly vital, because the question of what we bring to Europe—in a way, I formulated this answer. Because 55 artists, natives of Moldova from various towns, left a hundred years ago, scattered across the globe, and fertilized a vast number of diverse creative events—major global events that transpired in New York, Paris, Tel Aviv, Mexico, Canada, and Riga. I attempted to synthesize this.

By the way, it is highly interesting that literally the day after publication—I published the biographies of all these artists and their impact on my website—someone pointed out five more to me. So this process of searching for individuals, natives of Moldova who made a significant contribution to global culture, continues. And for my part, I simply resolved that instead of sharing advice—as you are asking me, while on the whole the authorities ask nothing of me—I will execute specific projects that depend on me, where I don't have to consult anyone. Yet the day after I published this file, this website, the head of the Jewish community of Moldova, Alexander Bilinkis, called and proposed creating an album and a museum.

Host: Marat, I suggest we discuss how things are progressing with the museum. We discussed this last time you were in Chisinau—that there would be your art space. Are there any developments on that front, and, fundamentally, when will it be open to visitors? That is my final question.

Guelman: My life situation currently is such that it is a highly active period. I manage a gallery in Brussels, my own private galleries in Belgrade and Berlin, and a cultural center in Montenegro. I have a new program now. In November, we are executing a project in New York again. On the whole, if individuals are found in Chisinau who need this at least as much as I do—I am not saying more, just at least as much—then the project will materialize. If that doesn't happen, then nothing will work out, because those are my life circumstances. But I am constantly thinking about making another gesture. For example, right now, having our own venue... I believe it is highly vital for Moldova and for Chisinau to establish a residency for international artists.

Host: I suggest we discuss this question in our next broadcast. Unfortunately, our time flew by very quickly. I want to ask you: how soon will you travel to visit the Moldovan capital?

Guelman: I am planning precisely to discuss this museum opportunity. I have some time in October.

Host: Well, then we await your arrival with good news. Thank you immensely for today's conversation and today's broadcast. It is always a pleasure to see you on UNTV.

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