.jpg)
Here is the accurate, professional English translation of the interview with Marat Guelman on Personally Yours.
The original conversational context, political nuances, and specific details—such as the elections in Moldova, the new Liberal Arts university in Montenegro, and Guelman's reflections on his political past—have been strictly preserved.
Марат Гельман: О выборах в Молдове, Холодной войне и Мета-России
Host: I wanted to begin with something I heard in one of your recent interviews. You don't give them very often, so there is always a reserve of questions. In one interview, you mentioned that you suddenly felt a cautious optimism—a hope that what is happening to our countries will change and perhaps end in the foreseeable future. Do you still hold that feeling that there is a light at the end of the tunnel?
Marat Guelman: I don't know if war fatigue can be called a light at the end of the tunnel, but yes, there is a sense that the motivational basis for the war has been exhausted. Putin has not achieved a single one of his declared goals, has not liberated territories, and it is increasingly difficult to ideologically justify the massive resources poured into the war. It is hard to answer the question: why, exactly, is all this happening?
On the part of Ukrainian society, there appears to be a readiness for certain scenarios—a North Korea-style freeze, and so on. But since fundamental processes are unfolding, the main thing for me is that people stop being killed. What anyone manages to achieve—we cannot know; man proposes, but God disposes. However, if people stop dying, that in itself is a basis for optimism.
Host: Am I correct that you felt these grounds for optimism when the situation shifted following the Ukrainian armed forces' entry into the Kursk region? Did that feel like a turning point?
Guelman: It wasn't just a shift, but the emergence of a real bargaining chip. Previously, when calls were made to sit at the negotiating table, it was clear what the Russian Federation could demand from Ukraine, but unclear what Ukraine could demand from Russia. Imagining a negotiation process where Putin only gives things up was difficult.
Now, we see a tangible item for exchange: "We return the Kursk region to you, and you give us, say, the Donetsk region." Zelenskyy stopped avoiding negotiations. Previously, he understood they were a losing proposition for him; now he feels he can exit the situation with a tangible benefit for Ukraine. This is crucial: if Putin is convinced he is winning, he is incapable of negotiating. But if he cannot clear Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region for three months, it is obvious he has a problem.
Host: That might be obvious to outside observers, but we don't know what Vladimir Putin understands. Rumors circulated recently that Donald Trump once spoke to Putin and told him to stop the war immediately, to which Putin refused. That might be election campaign rhetoric, but do you think any American president could press a metaphorical button to stop everything?
Guelman: What leverage does an American president have? They hold leverage over Russia: "We will supply Ukraine with maximum weaponry and grant them full authorization to strike any target inside Russia." That is the potential whip.
America has no carrots today, because no one will lift sanctions without Ukraine's consent. So there is only the whip. An American president can also pressure Ukraine.
There is a expectation that a new president—unlike a "lame duck" whom no one listens to—could force both sides to the table, assuming neither side has alternative motives. What do we fear? We fear that Trump has unstated motives, private commitments, or that Putin holds compromising material on him—topics that were widely discussed previously. Or that he might make a reckless move.
People like myself worry he might secure an unjust peace at Ukraine's expense. Yet he would likely frame it with a populist flourish: "Under my watch, the shooting stopped, the killing ended." He may be driven by personal motivations.
However, the processes unfolding today are deep; they expose fundamental contradictions. Any hasty fix will prove temporary. Since Russia's global isolation is extensive, the conflict must inevitably transition onto the tracks of a new Cold War—a long-term competition of economies, ideologies, soft power, and geopolitical influence.
A broad front is active right now: Georgia, Moldova, the Middle East, and Africa. On one side stand the bad actors—Putin, Khamenei, and their opportunistic allies—and on the other stands the international community. Shifting from hot war in Ukraine or the Middle East to this global ideological and economic confrontation is the trajectory we are observing.
Host: Since you mentioned Moldova, it is your birthplace, and you are a citizen by birth.
Guelman: That is correct, I am a citizen of Moldova.
Host: Voting results show a run-off in the presidential election, while the EU integration referendum passed by the narrowest of margins. President Maia Sandu continues her push toward Europe. What does this reveal?
Guelman: Some interpret the result as showing that half the population rejects Europe, but that is inaccurate. Despite the 50/50 split—decided by a margin of just a few hundred votes—the country faces a severe economic situation.
Pro-Kremlin networks in Moldova exploited this by corrupting the financial distribution system, directly buying negative votes. It is a tragic situation when individuals sell their country's future for a hundred or two hundred dollars. It indicates that the current administration's economic performance left much to be desired.
In Russia, individuals are willing to sacrifice their lives not for a hundred dollars, but for a million rubles, so their relatives can buy a house or a car. We don't claim the Russian government works in the interests of its citizens; it serves a specific power structure.
In Moldova, the ruling Action and Solidarity (PAS) party came to power on an anti-corruption wave. In developing nations, a recurring dilemma exists: you often choose between honest but inexperienced officials, or competent but corrupt ones. For a nation to possess both honesty and competence, it must be prosperous enough to compensate its civil servants well.
Maia Sandu made a logical strategic decision: if your domestic administration lacks deep expertise, you align with the European Union to leverage the institutional, legal, and intellectual resources of established European democracies. It was a rational step.
However, administrative shortcomings fuel an opposition that quickly finds financial backing—such as from the Kremlin administration. The Kremlin makes promises it has no intention of keeping. We saw this previously with former president Vladimir Voronin, who was expected to follow Moscow's line, only to refuse to sign the Kozak Memorandum at the last minute.
It is a complex dynamic. Not everyone opposing Maia Sandu is a Kremlin proxy; there are principled, competent individuals who are genuinely dissatisfied with the government's economic performance. Yet the Kremlin successfully exploited these domestic grievances. The risk that Maia Sandu could lose the presidency, or that PAS could lose its parliamentary majority in the upcoming elections, remains significant.
MOLDOVA'S POLITICAL DILEMMA
Option A: Honest / Inexperienced ──► Needs EU Institutional Backing
Option B: Competent / Corrupt ──► Susceptible to Kremlin Financing
Host: Watching the Russian opposition engage in internal feuds often makes one feel helpless. Yet in a 50/50 situation like Moldova, individual effort can yield a tangible result.
Guelman: That is a key distinction. In a 50/50 environment, targeted effort can alter the outcome. When the campaign began, figures like Dmitry Gudkov and myself were asked to help mobilize voters among the Russian-speaking diaspora where we hold influence.
When an election is decided by 500 or 700 votes, applying your expertise in a specific area can produce a measurable impact. That is what keeps people engaged. We don't want to bang our heads against a closed wall only to admit powerlessness two years later. Seeing a tangible outcome prevents depression.
Because the situation in Moldova is on a knife-edge, helping the country maintain its European trajectory is a meaningful endeavor. It makes sense to step back from internal Russian opposition disputes for a time and focus where effort yields real results.
Host: You view yourself as someone who can and should influence political trajectories in different countries. Why do you feel a personal need to intervene in Russian opposition politics or Moldovan affairs?
Guelman: That is an important question I ask myself regularly. There are several answers, but the primary driver is personal responsibility.
I do not view this through the lens of collective guilt; I view it through personal responsibility. I cannot disengage from the current situation because I was directly involved in shaping the past. The Effective Politics Foundation (FEP), the 1996 presidential campaign in Russia, the 2002 elections in Ukraine—these are chapters in my biography I cannot erase.
GUELMAN'S HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE
1996 Russian Election ──► Anti-Communist zeal bypassed democratic norms.
2002 Ukrainian Campaign ──► Political technology over-engineered outcomes.
Present Day Exile ──► Active effort to balance the moral scales.
Host: Were you convinced you were right back in 1996?
Guelman: In 1996, I was absolutely convinced. I believed we were fighting an existential battle against a Communist return, and that any tactic was justified to prevent it. "Buy food one last time"—I remember those campaign posters. It wasn't just me; the Soviet Union had collapsed only recently, and a Communist reversal felt like a real threat.
In hindsight, we made a fundamental mistake. Many of my former colleagues disagree and claim we did the right thing. But look at Moldova: back then, the Communists won the elections. Yet the institution of free elections and an independent press survived. Four years later, the Communists won again, then the Socialists, then the Democrats.
By blocking the Communists in Russia in 1996 through manipulated media and compromised electoral mechanics, we broke the system of independent media and fair elections. In doing so, we unwittingly laid the groundwork for an authoritarian regime that is no better than the Soviet system we tried to prevent.
I feel an imperative to act today because it is my personal responsibility—a work of correcting past mistakes. I want the scales of good deeds to weigh heavier by the end of my life.
Secondly, regarding Moldova: how do you solve the shortage of competent, honest administrators? You rely on two sources:
The Baltic states successfully utilized this approach after 1991, bringing back diaspora talent to build new state institutions.
.jpg)
At 63, I recognize I have perhaps 10 to 15 years of active professional life remaining. I no longer believe that the Russian political opposition in exile can directly alter the internal political reality inside Russia today. I recently spent an hour consulting members of the European Parliament. The most useful role we can play is providing realistic analysis to international policymakers.
As an active political force, the exiled political opposition currently holds limited leverage. An artist like Boris Grebenshchikov or popular musicians like Monetochka exert far more cultural influence over people than political committees.
THE DIASPORA INFLUENCE STRUCTURE
Cultural Figures (Grebenshchikov, Monetochka) ──► High Public Resonance
Exiled Political Committees (Anti-War Com.) ──► Analytical / Advisory Role
During the recent SlovoNovo forum in Montenegro, I noticed a shift. Previously, I could enlist cultural figures into organized anti-war political initiatives. Today, artists prefer to speak strictly in their individual capacities. They value their personal voice and refuse to act as proxies for political groups. The recent infighting between opposition factions alienated the diaspora's most valuable asset: its cultural community.
Host: In Russia, authorities are expanding the legal definition of "destructive ideologies"—banning childfree rhetoric, targeting LGBT communities, and threatening to block YouTube. How do you interpret this concept of "destructive ideology"?
Guelman: "Destructive ideology" is the regime's label for truth that is inconvenient.
When the state wants to censor facts, it uses "falsification" laws. But when a statement is factually undeniable—for instance, noting that Ukrainian forces entered the Kursk region—it cannot be labeled a "fake." It is true, but it is inconvenient. So it is branded as "destructive information." It functions much like Soviet-era ideological purges, where cybernetics was once labeled a "bourgeois pseudo-science."
The regime invents internal enemies it can easily defeat. They cannot defeat Ukraine on the battlefield or fix domestic economic failures, so they launch state campaigns against quadrobics or LGBT communities. It is easier to target defenseless subcultures than to address real domestic dangers.
The true threat to Russian society is the return of hundreds of thousands of traumatized combat veterans from Ukraine. We are seeing veterans return and commit violent crimes. They have been granted a social license for violence, and the state has no mechanism to manage this fallout.
In 1986, during the Soviet-Afghan War, 15,000 veterans returned, creating significant social friction and feeding into organized crime networks. Today, we are looking at 300,000 or more returning veterans—twenty times as many.
VETERAN DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT COMPARISON
Soviet-Afghan War (1986): 15,000 Veterans ──► Major Social Friction
Current War in Ukraine: 300,000+ Veterans ──► Massive Structural Crisis
A person can commit a violent crime, sign a military contract before trial, return to the front line, and avoid legal accountability entirely. This destroys the fundamental legal fabric of society. To distract the public from this unmanageable reality, the state manufactures panics over quadrobics or Western cultural influences.
Host: You mentioned that culture, education, and language must be preserved outside Russia. You helped establish a Liberal Arts university in Montenegro. Is this an effort to create an institutional sanctuary for culture?
Guelman: Precisely. We developed a concept called "Meta-Russia." To ensure Russian culture survives an era of domestic repression, three core institutions must exist outside the state's control: Language (publishing), Museums (visual art), and Universities (education).
THE THREE PILLARS OF "META-RUSSIA"
1. LANGUAGE 2. MUSEUMS 3. UNIVERSITIES
(Independent Books) (Exile Art Archives) (Liberal Arts Degrees)
In Montenegro, the Russian-speaking population now constitutes nearly 13% of the resident population, giving us the standing of a recognized cultural minority alongside Albanians or Celts.
We established a fully licensed European university operating a Liberal Arts faculty. Students complete a foundational first year covering philosophy and general humanities before selecting a specialization—history, philology, or social sciences. Our bachelor's degrees are recognized across European higher education networks.
The core faculty consists of former professors from the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences (Shaninka).
Concurrently, I am building an archive of Russian art in exile at our residency in Montenegro. We have hosted over 40 artists thus far, with a long-term goal of assembling a permanent collection representing 200 key exiled creators.
While the state inside Russia degrades, our objective is to ensure that the intellectual, artistic, and educational tradition survives intact in exile.
Host: Thank you, Marat. That is a constructive note to end on. Thank you for joining us today.
Guelman: Thank you.
